Delivered at the International
Conference on Igbo Studies A tribute to Simon Ottenberg, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, April 3-6,
2003
“Ọkwa lewere ọkụkọ nga ana abọ
ya na achị.
Ọkụkọ sị ya, achịla.
Na aka eji abọ ya ka aga eji bọọ gi.” ~~ Igbo
Proverb
“The
bush fowl saw the chicken being carved up and laughed.
The chicken told the bush fowl to stop laughing. For the same hands now
carving up the chicken would be used to carve up the bush fowl” ~~ Igbo Proverb Interpreted
ABSTRACT:
Many scholars, including those of Igbo extraction, have been concerned with the
resurgence of militant Islam in the Sudan, Indonesia, Palestine, and in the northern states of Nigeria. An increase of academic interest in Islamism and
terrorism is noticeable since the bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam, of the US warship Cole, and most importantly, the attacks on
the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the ongoing war against
terrorism. In Nigeria, in particular, while most scholarly and media attention
has been focused on Christian-Muslim dialogue, Sharia and the violence it
incited, very little is known about the danger lurking within Igboland: the
phenomenal increase in the number of Igbo Moslems and mosques, an incredible
development unknown before the Nigeria-Biafra War. This paper examines a bitter
historical irony: That while Ndigbo are being religiously, ethnically and
economically cleansed from the predominantly Islamic states of Nigeria, Igbo
Imams, Sheiks, Alahajis, Alhajas and mosques, once few and exotic, are now a
common sight in one of the most homogeneous Christian regions in Africa. It
argues that the quiet, secretive but aggressive Islamization and Arabization of
AlaIgbo is a clear and present danger to Igbo interests and survival; and
suggests countermeasures that would protect Igbo interests and assure the
nation’s survival.
CAVEAT ON METHODOLOGY
This study is limited and preliminary
for four reasons. First, given the secrecy and almost cult- like nature of
Islamic operations in AlaIgbo, it was virtually impossible to get any of the
Muslim leaders - Igbo and non-Igbo - to release relevant information on the
size of their membership, their religious, educational, charitable, and proselytizing
activities; their sources of funding is also a closely guarded secret.
Moreover, virtually all the Igbo Muslim leaders who could have provided
relevant information were on pilgrimage to Mecca during the research; and they refused to be
interviewed on their return. Second, it was equally extremely difficult to
glean information even from Igbo residents of areas with Muslim institutions:
Most of them – even including bishops, priests/pastors and laity- knew very
little about the activities of their Muslim neighbors. In fact it was shocking
to learn that many Igbo were unaware that an Igbo Moslem, Alhaji Yahaya Ndu,
was running for the Nigerian presidency under the African Renaissance Party.
Third, a more in-depth and substantive work will require extra time, resources,
and more ingenious investigative capabilities. Fourth, this study was,
unfortunately, hindered by tragedy: As this writer’s main researcher was
returning from one of his field interviews in Afikpo, he was waylaid by a band
of armed robbers, severely beaten, robbed, and left for dead on the road; the
teenage and heavily- armed bandits drove away in his car.
Islam in Igboland is
divided into seven parts: Caveat on Methodology, Introduction, Lessons from
History, Islam in Nigeria, Islam in Igboland, Islamic Weltanschauung, and
Epilogue. While it has as its primary focus the danger posed by the increasing
numbers of Igbo Muslim converts, it will, nonetheless, deal, tangentially, with
at least a group of Moslem strangers in our midst- the Hausas of Rivers State;
the “Meguards,” who are scattered all over AlaIgbo, keeping watch over the
homes of many absentee Igbo landlords, the “nnama” traders who have developed
important business links with Ndigbo, powerful Muslim oil tycoons plying their
trade from Port Harcourt, and other foreign Moslems, will be excluded .
INTRODUCTION
“Ndigbo nọ na nsegbu.” 1 (The Igbo are in trouble.) That is how a
foremost Igbo historian and scholar describes the present state of the Igbo
nation. But that, however, is an understatement. We are not merely in trouble,
Ndigbo are in a crisis, undoubtedly, the most serious socio-economic,
political, cultural, and religious crisis in our history. It is not within the
purview of this paper to enumerate the tragedies that have befallen our people
prior to the Nigeria-Biafra War and since the end of that long
forgotten holocaust: of the gory massacres documented by the Onyiuke Tribunal. 2 and A Call for Reparation and Restitution
submitted by Ohaneze to the Oputa Panel,
3 of mass starvation and the
Nigerian war of genocide that consumed about 2 million Biafran lives, of the
cyclic and systematic killings by Muslim militants symbolized by the gruesome
beheading of Gideon Akaluka in 1994, of the shootings and assassinations of
hundreds of MASSOB activists by the Nigerian police, especially the recent
Onuimo Massacre, in which about 300 members were either killed or injured and
200 arrested, including their leader, Uwazuruike; of the general insecurity in Igboland,
especially the phenomenal increase of police- induced armed robbery in churches
and rectories, and, finally, of the
diabolical attempt by various Nigerian regimes to reduce Ndigbo to a caucus of petty traders cursed with
impassable roads, a people mired in social, economic and political immobility.
All the same, it is, however, in the
cultural and religious realms that we face the greatest danger to our survival
as a people. Culturally, the Igbo are an endangered species, a gloomy and frightening
prospect that is a product of the increasing criminal neglect of the Igbo
language and heritage by the Igbo themselves. But even by far more troubling is
the state of our double religious heritage: Traditional Igbo Religion (TIR-
also known as Odinani) and Christianity. The former is gradually becoming
extinct, while the latter is yet to be fully born. Thus we are an “usuistic
people,” (like ụsụ, the bat- neither “an air nor a land animal”) –
confused, divided and caught between the primal and irresistible force of our
ancestral faith and the young and brash attractions and promises of a novel and
universal religion. In fact the present state of Christianity in Igboland is
not unlike the situation in North
Africa before the Islamic
conquest: Booming and prosperous in terms of numbers and physical
infrastructures but foreign and weak in terms of spiritual compatibility with
Igbo culture. This is because Christianity, the overwhelmingly predominant
religion of Ndigbo, is yet to become Igbo culture. And until religion becomes
culture, it lacks the spiritual, philosophical and ideological powers that
facilitate its ability to discharge its social and historic functions,
especially in times of crisis. Three of these key functions are the
mobilization and defense of an oppressed people as well as the authority to
issue and enforce sanctions. Other than
its otherworldly role to “save souls,” an authentic religion has also a secular
obligation: to promote and protect group interests, especially when other
traditional institutions are incapable of doing so. Indeed the root of
contemporary Igbo problem is the inability of either Traditional Igbo Religion
or Christianity to perform this critical function.
“Turning and
turning in the widening gyre
The falcon can not hear the falconer;
Thing fall apart, the center can not hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.” 4
Scholars of the religious
conflict in Nigeria, while generally acknowledging the religious
“divide” between Nigerian Christians and Muslims have, nonetheless, been overly
concerned with two issues: religious dialogue and Sharia. Kukah is apologetic
about Islamic violence in Nigeria, attributing it to the repressive nature of
military dictatorships that deny Muslims access to other channels of organized
opposition; 5 he sees dialogue as the only solution to the problem. Soyinka, a
proponent of religious tolerance, sees the introduction of Sharia as an attempt
by Northern Nigerian Muslims to “create a religious-political albatross by
creating a religious pretext for their dashed hopes.” 6
Ubaka, a priest and Islamic scholar, outlines the negative implications
of the recent introduction of Sharia in Nigeria for non-Christians. 7
While for Kenny, 8 Akintunde,
9 Onaiyekan 10 and
others, the intensification of dialogue is also the only solution to Muslim
attacks on Nigerian Christians.
Unfortunately, like their
Western contemporaries, none of the proponents of dialogue admits the failure
of Christian-Muslim dialogue in Nigeria in spite of decades of active inter
religious engagements at meetings and conferences on state, federal and
international levels. In fact none of them has proposed coherent Christian
countermeasures to deal with a resurgent, rampaging and violent Islam that has
massacred thousands of people, destroyed property worth billions of dollars,
and vowed to turn Nigeria into an Islamic Republic. With the exception of
the robust resistance of some Northern Nigerian Christians and Igbo co-religionists
to Sharia and Islamic violence since the return of “democracy”, most Nigerian
Churches, often boasting significant numbers of
Islamic scholars, have woefully failed in their role as the “good
shepherds”. In fact they have manifested a troubling lack of will to prevent
rampaging packs of Islamist “wolves” from destroying incredible numbers of
churches and ecclesiastical institutions as well as slaughtering and scattering
thousands of their flock. Under Obasanjo, “the born-again” Christian, most of the
Church leaders have manifested incredible naivete hoping that unlike previous
Muslim- dominated Nigeria regimes, they would be provided with adequate
security under a “Christian” president. Worse still, Igbo Church leaders, whose people constitute the overwhelming majority of the
victims of Islamic violence, have been unable to devise an action plan to
protect the people. This paper will analyze the danger posed by militant Islam
in Igboland and suggest countermeasures that would assure Igbo survival.
RELIGION AND SOCIETY
Generally, while the
otherworldly concerns of religion have been noted, 11
theological studies and the social sciences have over the years amassed
a vast quantity of information and speculation about the influence of religious
power in society. 12 Thus, as arguably the “most powerful and
pervasive force on earth,” 13 and potentially the primary source of crisis
and stability in the new century, religion’s place in the world is
understandably controversial. Consequently, scholars have posited both positive
and negative opinions as to the proper role of religion in society. Some of its basic and progressive functions
include: To “to unite its believers with a supreme center of loyalties,” to
“interpret political loyalty as a religious obligation, as a sanctuary from
political conflict, as a reconciler of political conflict,” 13 and
as the last line of defense for a culture. Religion can also become evil, 14 and
act “as a sanction for political conflict, as a source of political
conflict,” 15 and the engine of genocide and terrorism.
There are also those who would exclude religion from the public square, arguing
that as a private affair, it should play no overtly public role in a secular
society. 16 Some scholars even once claimed that religion
was dead.
But rumors about
religion’s demise and the purported triumph of scientism, materialism,
technology and the promise of endless progress, have been over
exaggerated. Scholars have identified
the 1970’s as the beginning of the “La Revanche de Dieu” (the Revenge of God),
a period marking the end of the global trend toward secularization, the “return
to the sacred,” and a robust and universal reassertion of religion in public
affairs. 17 This religio redivivus (religion- come-back- to-life) has had a
global impact on Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, leading in 1977 to the
victory of Menachem Begin, the pro religious Likud Party candidate, over the
secularist Israeli Labor Party; In 1978, Carol Wojtyla became Pope John Paul,
and began the movement to bring to an end the doctrinal and liturgical
confusion created by the aggiornamento (updating) of Vatican 11; Ayatollah
Khomeini returned to Teheran in February 1979, and established the Islamic
Republic of Iran. 18
In an important article
entitled “ The Next Christianity, ” Philip Jenkins makes a prediction: “
The twenty-first century will almost
certainly be regarded by future historians as a century in which religion
replaced ideology as the prime animating and destructive force in human
affairs, guiding attitudes to political liberty and obligation, concepts of
nationhood, and, of course, conflicts and wars. ” 19 According to him, the centers of gravest
state weakness are often the “regions in which political loyalties are
secondary to religious beliefs, either Muslim or Christian, and these are the
terms in which people define their identities.” (A 2000 Arizona State
University Study by Prof. Kevin Ellsworth found that to be the case in Nigeria) Jenkins
opines that across Africa, one of the critical issues to be faced by
governments will be “ whether Christian minorities can exist indefinitely under
an Islamic regime. ” 20. He warns that in Nigeria, “ likely population growth will be accompanied by
intensified rivalry, struggle for converts, and competition to enforce moral
codes by secular law.” 21. Jenkins also
reveals a fascinating geopolitical and religious trend: Over the last century,
Christianity’s center of gravity has been shifting Southward, to Africa, Asia, and Latin America, a
prospect that could lead to a “New Christendom” in the South. He cites US
intelligence, which predicts that in the coming decades, “governments will have
less and less control over flows of information, technology, diseases,
migrants, arms, financial transactions, whether legal or illegal across their
borders…The very concept of belonging to a particular state will probably
erode.” 22 Religious trends have the
potential to reshape political assumptions in a way not seen since the rise of
modern nationalism. 23. In his classic work, The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Huntington buttresses Jenkins’
position, by identifying Nigeria and the Sudan as the two countries in Africa
lying on the violent “fault line” between Christian and Islamic
civilizations. 24. Igboland lies at the epicenter of the “fault
line clash” of civilizations between Christianity and Islam in Africa.
ISLAM AND CHRISTIANITY: LESSONS IN HISTORY
A political sage once
said: “Without history, there is no context. Without context, we will not know
what to do.” 25. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the
danger posed by Islam to Igbo survival without placing in sitz im leben the
phenomenal speed and modus operandi with which Mohammed conquered the warring
Bedouin tribes, consolidated Islam in the Arabian peninsula, and carried the young religion beyond Arabia.
To its contemporaries, the historical
context of the pre- Islamic world could not have looked more inauspicious for
the young but ambitious Arab nationalist religion. When Islam burst out from
the dry and relatively isolated fast nesses of the Arabian peninsula in the 7th century, it had to confront
the Greco-Roman Byzantine (395-1453) and Sassanid Persian (224-651) empires,
two of the most civilized peoples on earth.
26. But in spite of the remoteness and mystery with which it was
associated, Arabia was not totally cut off from the influence of its
more powerful neighbors. For not only were there regular commercial links
between them, Mohammed had to deal with the Christian and Jewish communities
that were widespread in the region. 27
For example, Mecca, the city that would become Islam’s holiest place,
boasted of an Archbishopric, while Medina had a synagogue.
28 But after initial signs of tolerance, the Muslims either massacred or
expelled members of both religions.
29. This action, the first sign
of a new and intolerant faith, was taken on the basis of a statement credited
to Mohammed before his death: “Two religions should not co-exist in the Arabian peninsula. ” 30
Within the Persian Empire, where Zoroastrianism was the official creed,
religious pluralism also reigned, and Nestorian Christian communities
flourished from Iraq, Bahrain, Oman, Afghanistan and even into China. And while the Greco-Roman Byzantine rulers were
less tolerant of religious diversity, and saw the Arab Christians- Copts,
Monophysites and Nestorians as heretics and schismatics, and persecuted them- Byzantium, nonetheless, promoted Judaeo- Christian values
that were sources of unity and integration within the Eastern Roman Christian
empire. Today these Churches have either been wiped out or are on the verge of
extinction. The gradual but inexorable destruction of Eastern Christianity by
Islam is an object lesson in Muslim attitude toward Christians, especially in
Igboland.
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Prior to the rise of
Islam, Christianity was the dominant religion of the Middle East. And the clash between the two religions started
from the very beginning. Two letters from Islamic leaders to the two older
faiths point to this ancient clash of civilizations. One of the first recorded
official contacts between Christianity and Islam was the letter sent by
Mohammed to Heraclius, ruler of the Byzantine Empire,
on May 11, 628 AD,
four years before his death. 31 “ I call you to Allah, ” he commanded, “ and
I invite you and your people to Allah, Mighty, Sublime. I have done my duty of
conveying the message and counsel, so accept my advice. ” 32 Another letter
sent by Khalid, the Moslem leader, to the reigning Persian Satrap before
attacking Iraq and Persia, is also indicative of Islamic intentions: “ Accept
the faith and you are safe; else pay tribute, you and your people; which if you
refuse you shall have yourself to blame. A people is already on you, loving
death even as you love life. ” 33 However, the brazen, authoritative and
undiplomatic language of these letters may be understood only in the light of
overall Islamic military and political strategy, which softened and facilitated
the takeover of non- Muslim lands. Prior to the first military conflict between
the new religion and Byzantine Empire, Islam held the advantage in four areas:
First, Muslim leaders had a strategic vision (they planned ahead); they were able to win over to their side by
infiltration some Arab Christian groups, in whose hands lay the defense of the
borders of Byzantium. These local Christians- Nestorians, Jacobites, and even
Melkites- whom the Muslims had earlier infiltrated, were to join the Moslem
invaders in order to participate in the sacking of the towns and populations
among whom they had lived. 34 Second, Islam had a psychological advantage
because many Christians saw them as liberators from Graeco- Roman rule. The
naivete of the Christians, which often preceded Islamic conquest of their
nations, was expressed in a letter sent by a Jordanian Christian tribe to the
Moslem army as it approached their land: “ O Muslims, we prefer you to the
Byzantines, though they are not of our faith, because you keep better faith
with us and are more merciful to us and refrain from doing us injustice and
your rule over us is better than theirs, for they have robbed us of our goods
and our homes” 35 Third, both the
Byzantine and Persian Empires were totally ignorant of the new religion and
underestimated the danger it posed to their very existence. In fact they
misinterpreted the initial Islamic invasion as a part of the regular razzias
during which pagan Arabian tribes would invade their border regions, rob and
steal for awhile, and, then, return to their harsh homeland. Unknown to them,
Islam had transformed the razzias into jihad and a potent weapon of a permanent
Arab hegemony. Fourth, Islam was a more
nationalist, militant and fanatical religion, promising its warriors incredible
earthly booty in victory and a paradise of material and sensual delights in
death. According to Philip Hitti, “the Islam that first conquered was not the
religion but the state, not Muhammadism but Arabism. The Arabians burst upon an
unsuspecting world as a nationalist theocracy seeking a fuller life.” 36
Consequently, in the first
major battle between Christianity and Islam, the Arabs. With only 40,000 ill
equipped and poorly disciplined soldiers, they defeated a 100, 000 –man
Byzantine army, “the most efficient and highly organized army that the West
could provide,” 37 at Yarmuk in 634 AD.
And even though monks and Bishops moved among the troops warning of the danger
defeat posed to the faith, it was
evident that “many in the Imperial Army did not in the least care what happened
to the Church, for the clergy had lost the confidence of the laity and were
extremely unpopular.” 38 Moreover, the
conscripted Christian army was “no match for the wild and fanatical fervor of
the Muslims, who saw, if they were killed, a paradise of sensual delights and
if they survived, boundless spoils, captive girls, well-watered lands, houses
and wealth.” 39 And most importantly, Christian Churches
exhibited obvious weaknesses in three key areas: (1) Doctrinal conflicts among
the various denominations led to internal divisions which was exploited by
Islam (2) Confusion and weakness on moral, social and political teachings, the
fulcrum of religious life, led to apathy and decline within the Churches (3)
The replacement of early Christian attributes that facilitated its peaceful
conquest of the Roman empire- inflexible zeal, austere morals, miraculous
powers, and the doctrine of a future life - by a folk Christianity that
encouraged countervailing values, promoted internal decay in society. 41 And
within a few years, the whole of the Middle East was
in Moslem hands, thanks to all these contributing factors. According to Gibbon,
“while the (Byzantine) state was exhausted by the Persian war, and the Church
was distracted by the Nestorian and Monophysite sects, Mohammed, with the sword
in one hand and the Koran in the other, erected his throne on the ruins of
Christianity and Rome.” 40
Contrary to some of their
expectations, the Islamic invasion and takeover of the Middle East was a disaster for its overwhelmingly Christian
majority, as is evident from the reactions of its leaders. Delivering a sermon
on Christmas Day 634, Sophronius, the
Patriarch of Jerusalem, wept because he was prevented from making the
traditional Christmas pilgrimage to Bethlehem, “not detained by tangible bonds, but chained and
nailed by fear of the Saracens,” whose “savage, barbarous and bloody sword”
kept them locked up in Jerusalem. 41. In an Epiphany Day sermon
in 636, he bemoaned “the destruction of churches and monasteries, the sacked
towns, the fields laid waste, the villages burned down by nomads who were
overrunning the country” 42 In a letter to Sergius, the Patriarch of
Constantinople in the same year, he condemned the ravages done by the
Arabs. 43 Michael, the Syrian (1166-1199), the Jacobite
Patriach of Antioch, used earlier sources to describe the impact of the Islamic
conquests: “From the beginning of the empire of the Arabs, they went out to
take prisoners, to pillage, steal, ambush, invade and destroy whole regions
during all of Muhammad’s life” 44
In spite of their
incredible resilience, the condition of Middle Eastern Christians has worsened
over the centuries, especially with the contemporary resurgence of Islamism.
For example, if present trends continue in the Holy Land, there will be few if any Christians living in Bethlehem, the birth place of Christ, in another
decade. 45 “ The same is true of Nazareth, where Jesus grew up, and even of Jerusalem, where nearly 600 historic churches still stand.
” 46 Both Bethlehem and Nazareth, once overwhelmingly Christian cities, are now
predominantly Moslem. “Today three-fourths of all Bethlehem Christians live
abroad, and more Jerusalem Christians live in Sydney, Australia than in the place of their birth.” Christians now
comprise only 2.5 percent of Jerusalem; they include a few born in the Old City when Christians constituted the majority. In 1950,
Christians in the Palestinian territories made up 15 percent of the Arab
population. Today they have been reduced to just 2 percent. According to the
1997 The Times of London report, “life in (Palestine Authority ruled) Bethlehem has become insufferable for many members of the
dwindling Christian minorities. Increasing Muslim-Christian tensions have left
some Christians reluctant to celebrate Christmas in the town at the heart of
Christ’s birth.” 47
Outside the Holy Land, the fate of Christianity is also grim. In the
last ten years, fully half of all Iraqi Christians have clandestinely
emigrated. As a result of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1995), during which
600,000 emigrated and 100,000 were killed, Lebanese Maronite Christians, once a
solid majority in the country, have been reduced to less than a million of the
population. Saudi Arabia has no native Christians, and forbids its 4
million Christian guest workers to practice their faith. “It is illegal to import, print or own
Christian or non-Muslim religious materials, and Christians have been jailed
and deported” for breaking the law. In the last two decades, militant Islam has
facilitated the shriveling of once thriving and vibrant Christian communities,
and led to the exodus of 2 million Christians. In 50 years, it is estimated
that Christianity may well be extinct in the Middle East. 48 Those
who still insist that Islam is “a religion of
peace” have either not read an impartial history of the religion, or are
yet to meet a Christian from a predominantly Muslim country.
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM IN EGYPT
In 639 AD, barely two
decades since its founding, Islamic forces invaded Egypt and conquered it in 640 AD. Prior to that, the
land of the Pharaohs had traditional occupied a special place in Christian
history. About three hundred years before Christ, it was conquered by Alexander
the Great (332), and underwent intensive Greek colonization, called
Hellenization; Greek language and culture was dominant among the urban
population. Alexandria surpassed Athens as a center of Greek life and culture. And even
though Julius Caesar conquered Egypt in 30 B.C., Alexandria extended the influence of its superior Greek
philosophical schools even to Rome. With the advent of Christianity, Alexandria became the head of Eastern Christianity, played an
ecclesiastical leadership role second only to Rome in the early Church, and once had one hundred Bishops. While its first
Bishop was St. Mark , the Evangelist (62 AD), the Egyptian Church also produced such Church Fathers like Clement, Origen, Athanatius
and St. Anthony, the Father of Christian monasticism. “So it is understandable
that Christian theology in the proper sense of the word first started in Alexandria.”
Like their co-
religionists in the Middle East, the Islamic conquest of Christian Egypt was
facilitated by internal weaknesses: the civil war among the Byzantines, Coptic
hatred of Greek Christians who persecuted them as heretics, doctrinal and
organizational disunity among Christians, and the power of Islamic propaganda
to which some Copts may have fallen victim as is evident in Mohammed’ directive
to his followers: “The Copts of Egypt are uncles and in-laws, and they will
support you against your enemy and help your religion.” 49 Yet, it will be facile to explain the
Islamic victory in the context of Coptic misperception of Muslims as liberators
from Roman yoke, as some scholars have done. “But this misinterpretation overlooks
the basic fact that Egypt considered herself part and parcel of the Roman Empire which in turn was identified with the universal
Church. The Copts were far from thinking of themselves as an “independent
African church.” In their own eyes they were the protagonists of orthodoxy
within the universal Church and at that time negotiations for reconciliation
were still going on.” According to an eyewitness to the invasion, “some fled,
some went over to the invaders and some resisted stubbornly.” The Greeks and
the Hellenized Christians were among the first to flee.
Thus the history of Coptic-Muslim
relations in Egypt is not unlike that of Christians in the conquered lands of Syria, Iraq and the Holy Land.
Initially, the Copts thought they shared mutual interests with the Moslems; they
were initially treated as full citizens and some even rose to positions of
great responsibility under Islamic rule. Their religious beliefs and traditions
were respected with some of their feasts declared as state holidays.
Yet, periods of harassment
and attempts to suppress Egyptian Christianity predominated and often met with
resistance. Under the discriminating legislation, known as the Covenant of
Omar, the Christians were reduced to the state of dhimmitude- “protected” tax- paying second class
citizens, without socio-economic, political and military opportunities. Banned
from the army and important government positions, large numbers converted to
Islam in order to take advantage of the benefits of full citizenship. Others,
however, resisted, engaging in a series of revolts between 725 AD and 831 AD.
50 Under one of the Fatimide rulers, the Copts were forced to wear special
clothing in order to distinguish them from the Moslems; monasteries were
looted, church land confiscated, and the ringing of church bells banned. But
this was the most shameful and outrageous punishment meted to them: Copts were
ordered to wear around their necks wooden crosses weighing five pounds and
sixty centimeters long. 51 According to the Chronicle of John, Bishop of
the Egyptian island of Nikiou between 693 AD and 700 AD, an interdenominational
war that was raging among Christians when the Arabs invaded Egypt in December
639, enabled them to commit unspeakable atrocities against the people: “But let
us say no more, for it is impossible to describe the horrors the Muslims
committed when they occupied the Island of Nikiou as well as the terrible
scenes which took place in Cesarea in Palestine.” 52 Egyptian Christians had
discovered only too late that the Muslims were conquerors and not liberators
after all. Never in their wildest dreams did they realize that by their initial
collusion, they had unwittingly condemned not only their Christian country but
also the thriving churches of North
Africa- and indeed large
regions of Africa- to centuries of Moslem conquest and domination.
Today the Copts, the
descendants of one of the most ancient Christian communities, have been reduced
to only 10 percent of the Egyptian population. They are still an oppressed
people, barred from full participating in the socio-economic, political, and
military life of the country. In fact during a visit to Egypt a few years ago, this writer came face to face
with the plight of its Christian population. At the dilapidated St Sargius
Coptic Church outside Cairo
- which according to ancient tradition is “ the oldest Christian Church in the
world,” (since as a synagogue it had harbored the infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph
after their flight from Herod), a Coptic priest pulled this writer aside and whispered
into his ears: “ Look at this ancient church. It is on the verge of collapse
because the Egyptian Government has refused us permission to fix it. When you
get back to America, tell the Christians that the Moslems are
destroying us.” Yet, despite centuries of oppression, “ the survival and
strength of Christianity in Egypt, after thirteen centuries of Arab domination, is
unique in the story of the ancient Christian churches of north Africa.” 53
THE DESTRUCTION OF NORTH AFRICAN CHRISTIANITY
In
the Maghreb (Tunisia (Carthage), Morocco and Algeria), Latin Christianity also
blossomed, producing St. Victor, Pope and martyr, Saints Felicitas and Perpetua
(d. 203 AD), and the famous Theological School of Carthage (modern Tunis) under
Tertullian and St. Cyprian (248-258 AD). It was at this renowned institution
that the Catholic Church enunciated the doctrine of “extra ecclesiam nulla
salus.” (Outside the Church there is no salvation). However, the Christian
Church of North Africa reached its zenith with St. Augustine (354-430), the greatest of the Church Fathers, the
first thinker to attempt a systematic philosophy of society, a political
thinker of great consequence, inventor of subjective literature, and a man with
a profound influence on Christian thought and practice.
But divided, fragmented,
and weakened by doctrinal differences, especially the Donatist heresy, North
African Christianity was in trouble. After repeated attacks that led to the
devastation and depopulation of the region, Carthage fell to the Moslems in 697 AD. Of its 300 Bishops
only 30 stayed behind. Unlike the Good Shepherd who gave his life to his flock,
the others abandoned the faithful and fled to Europe. The lack of an ordained native clergy as well as the inability of
the church to develop an indigenous
liturgy through inculturation, facilitated the demise of North African
Christianity. Some Christian Berber groups fled across the Sahara. One of their chiefs and his people settled near Niamey in present day Niger Republic. After some resistance, the North African Berbers were won over by
the Arabs and converted to Islam. One of the new converts, a chief named Tarik,
became governor of Mauretania. In 711, he led a Berber army, crossed the Sea and
conquered a greater part of Spain, and took Islam to Europe. Gibraltar – the Rock of Tarik,- is named after him. With the
exception of small numbers of Christian migrants to the Maghreb, Christianity is almost extinct in the region.
THE RESISTANCE AND DESTRUCTION OF BLACK AFRICAN CHRISTIAN KINGDOMS
Together with Egypt in the north, it is understandable that Black
African lands to the South, were among the first areas of the world to embrace
Christianity. First, their proximity to the Holy Land, the birth place of the new religion, made that
possible. Second, the historical and symbiotic relationship between pre-
Christian Egypt and Black Africa is well documented: Before and after
numerous invasions by European and Asian
peoples, the ancient Egyptians had always seen the South as the land of their
ancestors, a place of refuge, re- grouping, and resistance in times of crisis.
At the time of Isaiah, the prophet, the Black Nubian (Nobotae) King Piankhi,
had conquered and ruled over Egypt as a mighty Pharaoh; the details of his campaign
are preserved in the Egyptian museum in Cairo. Piankhi had also sent a military expedition to Palestine (Is 18:1, 20:3, 37:9), a land that was once part
of the great Egyptian empire that extended beyond the “Fertile Crescent.” Isaiah called these Nubians “a people, tall and
bronzed (smooth skinned);” and the historian, Herodotus, praised them as
“tallest and most beautiful of men.” At the time of Christ, queens called
Kandakes, ruled the kingdom, and the Eunuch baptized by Philip, the Apostle, was
surely a top Nubian official (Act 8:27).
Nubia, the biblical Kush
(“ the South ”), which the Septuagint (the Greek version of the Hebrew Old
Testament translated in Alexandria in the 3rd century B.C.) renders
as “Ethiopia,” is not the same region as the present Ethiopian state, but
encompasses modern Sudan and the valley of the nile from the Second Cataract to
the Sixth. The country was divided into three kingdoms: Nobatia (north), Alodia
(south), and Makuria (central). While the origins of Nubian Christianity is
shrouded in mystery, the excavations at Faras indicate its presence already in
the 5th century even before the official conversion of the 540’s,
when the Empress Theodora sent an Alexandrian Copt, Julian, to the Nobatia.
Makuria was evangelized by Orthodox missionaries sent by Emperor Justinian the
Great; while Alodia was converted in the 580’s by missionaries sent from
Nobatia. Nubian monks were known to have lived in Egypt in the 4th century; and many Coptic
(Egyptian) Christians had been forced to flee to Nubia in the 4th century during the Arian
heresy. According to Origen (c.240 AD), one of the Fathers of the Church,
Christianity was even preached in Black Africa from its very beginning. After
Makuria united the kingdoms, Nubia recognized the Coptic Patriarch in Alexandria.
It is ironical that the Nubian Church blossomed between 700 AD and 1250 AD after the fall of Egyptian and
North African Christianity. But this irony is understandable: Nubian
Christians, alerted and troubled by the sudden collapse of the faith as well as
the fate of their co-religionists in the north, must have realized the
importance of strengthening Christianity as a bulwark against Islam. The period
of expansion began during the reign of King Mercurios (697-710), who was called
the “New Constantine.” The military and political power of the kingdom is
evident in its ability to act as protector of its sister church in Egypt. For example, in 743, after Omar, the Muslim governor of Egypt, launched a holy war against
the Christians- destroying churches, converting convents into mosques, and
imprisoning the Patriarch, the head of the African churches- Cyriacus (King of
Kings) of Makuria led a 100,000- man army into Egypt and forced the release of
the Patriarch; 54 and he only left with
the promise that Christians would no longer be persecuted.
Modern excavations have
also revealed the incredible religious and material achievements of this
ancient Black African kingdom. They include a cathedral connected to the royal
palace, books in Old Nubian, Coptic, and Greek; one contains a list of kings,
another, of 27 Bishops called metropolitans. There are about 169 exquisite
paintings in the Byzantine style. “The paintings depict many dark-skinned
bishops and rulers, such as the
Metropolitan Petros (967-999).” The presence of Nubian liturgical books and
Black bishops from the 10th century indicate a high degree of
inculturation and indigenization. Nubia was also known for its many churches: “There were
several in every large town, one in just about every small village…and churches
scattered over large urban centers, along those of greater splendor in the
“Cathedral Cities.” 55
But flush from its victory
over Egyptian and Middle Eastern Christians, a large Islamic army led by
Abdallah, the new Arab governor of Egypt, swept southward and attacked Nubia in 643 AD. Led by King Kalydosos and adopting
their traditional strategy of “hasty and confused retreat,” the “frightened”
Africans allowed the invaders to advance deeply into Black territory until
“100,000…Blacks turned in flanking onslaughts that almost completely wiped out
the entire Arab army.” Even Arab historians of the period admit that “it was
the most devastating defeat ever suffered by an Arab army.” 56 A second Muslim
attack in 651, while partially successful in destroying Dongola, the Makurian
capital and its famous cathedral, however, failed to break the spirit of the
Africans who, under the great King Kalydosos, adopted a “no surrender” strategy
that led to the Treaty of Baqt (652 AD), an agreement of equals that had
serious implications for both Arabs and
Africans: (1) The Arabs were so psychologically damaged by two defeats
at the hands of Blacks that they sued for peace that lasted for 600 years. 57 (2)
Treaty provisions included the promotion of increased trade, Islamic missionary
work, and the building of a huge mosque in Dongola, and facilitated the
expansion of slavery and the peaceful conquest of the Sudan, objectives the
Muslims were unable to achieve through war. And finally, in 1316 AD, Islam
achieved its long sought ambition: Dongola was destroyed and the last King of
the Black African Christian kingdoms of the South was put to flight. 58
Today, the long running
struggle of Southern Sudanese Christians and Traditional African Religionists
against the Islamist government in Khartoum is a continuation of the historic battle waged by
Black Africans against slavery, Islamization and Arabization in Nubia. Over 2 million Southern Sudanese have perished in
the last two decades in this “quiet holocaust.” Today, Muslims are still
selling thousands of Southern Sudanese children into slavery. Ethnic cleansing
is common, especially in villages near the oil fields in southern Sudan. And despite numerous peace conferences, Arab
governments in the North have consistently rejected a fundamental Southern
demand: the right to self determination, or even the decentralization of power.
ISLAMIZATION OFNIGERIA
After the destruction of
the North African and Black Christian kingdoms, Islam swept further south,
firmly establishing itself in Kano in the second half of the 15th century
and spreading to other parts of the north. . However, it was not until 1802,
when the major Islamization of Northern Nigeria, then part of the Sudan, began with the jihad of the Fulani leader Uthman
dan Fodio. Under the pretext of reform, he conquered the Hausa states, which he
claimed were practicing a corrupt form of Islam, installed the Sokoto
Caliphate, and consolidated the religion in the presently core Moslem parts of
the north. Fulani emirs were also forced on the conquered lands, a situation
that prevails even to this day. Borno, which has reportedly an ancient
Christian presence, had fallen to Islam as early as the 8th century.
However, attempts to impose Islam on other national groups – the Tivs, Idomas,
Biroms etc.- met with stiff resistance.
After the British defeat
of the Caliphate in the 19th century, a pro- Islamic policy that
would have negative implications for the Nigerian polity, was instituted.
First, it undermined the historic struggle for freedom waged by non-Muslim
minorities in the north: For example, while the new colonial power restricted
Christian missionaries to “pagan” areas and barred them from the predominantly
Moslems sections of the north, Islamic missionaries were allowed to make new
converts, often by force, among the Traditional African Religionists, who had
historically waged a largely successful war against Islamic penetration and
occupation of their land. Eventually, it was mostly from these non-Moslem
ethnic groups that Christian missionaries were able to make new converts.
Second, British policy impeded the first attempt made by Bishop Adjai
Crowther’s CMS “Sudan” party, which woefully failed to convince the conquered
Hausa kingdoms to throw off the Fulani yoke; Third the more successful
Evangelical groups who came after Crowther, were also restricted to the
minorities: the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) in 1893, and the Sudan United
Mission (SUM) in 1906. Their mission was intended to save the “pagans” before
they came under Islamic rule. Catholics and other Protestant missionaries were
also active in the north during that period – but also equally restricted. However,
today, millions of Northern Nigerian Christians belong to ECWA and TEKAN, which
grew out of the SIM and SUM respectively, and to other Catholic and Protestant
denominations. For example, the Catholic Archdiocese of Kaduna is the third
largest Catholic metropolitan see in Nigeria. It is sad and unfortunate, however, that as a
result of political calculations by both the British and subsequent Nigeria governments, Northern Nigerian Christians have
historically been undercounted, marginalized, and persecuted by their Moslem
neighbors. Moreover, these Christians have also been politically impaired by
the traditionally passive brand of Christianity preached by the missionaries,
especially in the face of a militant, aggressive and assertive Moslem
neighbors. Otherwise how would one explain the fact that, for example, Adamawa State, which is about 60% Christian, has historically been dominated by the
Moslem minority? 59 Or that Bauchi State, which is 46% Christian, is considered by many as a Moslem state?
With the Islamic victories
in the north, the jihad warriors almost fulfilled their oath to dip the Koran
into the waters of the Atlantic
Ocean by carrying the
Halfmoon deep into Yoruba South, and
incorporating into their empire, the Caliphate of Sokoto, and the northern part
of the Yoruba kingdom centered on Old Oyo. The Muslims were also able to
penetrate other parts of the former Western Nigeria
by intermarriage and trade. And although Nigerian population figures are
unreliable, some estimates place the Moslems at 33% in 1960 and about 50%
presently.
The extent and depth of
Islamic penetration of the Yoruba nation is evident from developments since the
introduction of a more violent brand of sharia in Zamfara state in 2000 and its
rapid enactment by 12 other northern states. During a courtesy visit to the Niger state governor, Abdulkadir Kure, Dr. Ibrahim Datti
Ahmad, president of the Supreme Council of Sharia in Nigeria, said that “the council’s immediate target is to
work for the implementation of Sharia legal system in Kwara and Oyo
states. 60 It was, therefore, not
surprising that Oyo has embraced sharia within four months. Under the aegis of
the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN), Lagos inaugurated an Independent Sharia Panel on December 11,
2002; 61 there are calls to extend the barbaric
practice to other states in Oduduwaland. Christian-Muslim tensions have also
risen in the region as fanatical Yoruba Moslems attempt to force their religion
down the throat of non-Moslems.
SHARIA
Indeed the path to subsequent efforts to
introduce Sharia and turn Nigeria into an Islamic state may be traced to two key
policies adopted by the British government after bringing its various nations
under colonial control in 1900 and imposing amalgamation in 1914. The first was
geopolitical, the second, legal: British officials divided the country in such
a manner that the northern region was larger than the rest of the country. And
in order to permanently ensure Muslim dominance of their of their geographical
contrivance, they ignored the country’s natural riparian divide, and five years
before independence, moved the border further south, adding to the north
sections of the Middle Belt that were formerly part of the Eastern region. The British
also created two separate laws for the country: In 1900, a truly secular legal
system based on customary laws, the English common law, and statutory
provisions, was imposed on the South, a form of Sharia embodying Islamic
personal law was part of the penal code in the North. Unlike Atartuk, the
reformist Moslem leader, who outlawed Sharia in the overwhelmingly Islamic
country, and replaced it with an authentically secular constitution, the
British preserved sections of the Islamic code as part of Nigerian
jurisprudence. While this favoritism toward Muslims may have had a racist tinge
(the British also ceded power to the “civilized” northern Sudanese “Arab”
Muslims and failed to protect the “primitive” Black southern Christians and
Traditional Religionists), this was done as “a concession to stem the tide of
resistance to the British colonial rule…”
62 Indeed the use of violence or threats of violence, which has
historically been a potent weapon used by Nigerian Muslims to achieve and/ or
protect their interests, has traditionally given them an undue advantage over
their more peaceful, pacifist, and divided Christian competitors, who were
often taught by the missionaries that the morally correct response to violence
was to “turn the other cheek.” It is doubtful that many of them understand the
moral obligation of legitimate self defense in a crisis, of which Christ
himself approved when he told his disciples: “When I sent you forth without a
money bag or a sack or sandals, were you in need of anything? No, nothing, they
replied…But now one who has a money bag should take it, and likewise a sack,
and ONE WHO DOES NOT HAVE A SWORD SHOULD SELL HIS CLOAK AND BUY ONE.” (Luke 22:35-36).
MURTALA TO OBASANJO
Emboldened by, and
respectful of, the obvious privileges historically given to Islam, their
fanaticism, and willingness to employ violence to achieve their objectives,
various Nigerian military and civilian regimes have consistently promoted the
efforts by the Moslem north to Islamize and Arabize the rest of the country.
But of all of them, however, the Murtala, Obasanjo (1&2), and Babangida
dictatorships, were the greatest facilitators of the sharia project in Nigeria. Contrary to his populist image as a Nigerian
“nationalist,” General Murtala Mohammed was in fact a diehard Islamist. In an
article entitled “Nigeria: Neither an Islamic nor a Christian Country,” 63 Professor Omo Omoruyi revealed that it was
the death of the Nigerian dictator that temporarily halted his plan “to make Nigeria an Islamic Republic in the fashion of Libya.” Even then, he wrote, “Murtala’s death did not
kill the plan, as his followers in the military and the civilian wings of the
geo-ethno-military-clique, that is the northern leadership were aware of the
plan and pushed it to the Constitution Drafting Committee.” of 1977/78. On
replacing the assassinated “Butcher of Asaba,” General Matthew Olusegun
Obasanjo was bent on carrying out his boss’ Islamic plan. For he “did not see
anything wrong with the provision as propounded by the pro-sharia zealots. He
did not see anything wrong with having the sharia court up to the highest level
of the federal judiciary with a Grand Mufti as the head of the Federal Supreme Sharia Court. He was not opposed to the plan to have parity
between the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Grand Mufti of the Supreme Sharia Court.” In fact according to Maitama Sule, Nigeria’s former Permanent Representative to the UN and a
Sharia proponent, Obasanjo, Mohammed’s deputy, fully endorsed the creation of a
Sharia Court of Appeal.
Nonetheless, it was left
to General Babangiga (1985-1993) to push the Sharia agenda to a crescendo
unknown in the annals of Nigerian history. Ignoring the governing organs of the
Military Government as well as troubled Nigerian Christians, he organized a
mission led by a non-member of the government, the Sultan of Sokoto, to
formally admit Nigeria into the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)
in 1986. Since it was not discussed either publicly or in the Armed Forces Ruling
Council (AFRC), IBB’s action was condemned by millions of Nigerians, including
Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe, the Chief of General Staff, who was forced to retire
from the military because of his position. In a belated attempt to pacify and
divert the attention of his critics, Babangida set up 20- man panel to “examine
the implications of the country’s full membership of the organization (OIC).”
But in order to show his utter disregard for his critics, he unilaterally made Nigeria a shareholder of the Islamic Development Bank in
January 1988.
Ironically, several
developments in the country indicate that Islamization has made its greatest
progress during the presidency of Obasanjo, a self- proclaimed “born again”
Christian, than at any other time in Nigeria’s history.
First, it was during his tenure – on January 27, 2000- that Alhaji Sani Ahmed, the governor of Zamfara
state, signed the Zamfara State Sharia Constitution into law and turned his
impoverished state into an Islamic State. Since then, thirteen other states
have followed suit. They include Sokoto, Kano, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe, Bornu, and Niger states. For Datti Ahmed, president of the National
Council for Sharia Implementation, “it is a tremendous achievement that Sharia
has been re-introduced…after being almost totally absent from this country for
nearly 100 years, since the coming of the British to Kano in 1903.”
64 Second, the enactment of Sharia has repeatedly received the full
endorsement of the Obasanjo administration. For example, despite initial
vacillation on the contentious issue, the Nigerian president, in order to
ingratiate himself with the Caliphate, has continuously and brazenly shattered
the country’s “secular status.” Asked in a recent British Broadcasting (BBC)
interview about the unwillingness of his administration to oppose the Islamic
code, Obasanjo was unequivocal in his response: “I can not do that because the
states have the constitutional right to make law (on it)” 65 Indeed he has not only acknowledged the
constitutionality of the Islamic code, the Nigerian ruler has earned the
unenviable distinction of performing the opening ceremonies of more Sharia
courts and mosques than any other Head of State in Nigerian history. Third,
contrary to public assurances, the implementation of the Islamic legal code has
not been restricted to Moslems but also applied to Christians as well. Fourth,
Sharia has incited the worst violence since the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War
and led to the killing of over 10,000 people under the Obasanjo administration.
“ In Kaduna , 875 Christians alone were killed in the
conflicts and 800 church buildings were destroyed. Twenty pastors were also
killed.” 66 During the recent Miss World riots in the same city, over 200
people were massacred by Muslim fanatics. They include 78- year old Catholic
priest, Rev. James Odion Iyere of Holy Cross Church. A former Nigerian Army Chaplain, he “was beaten,
stabbed and burned.” 67
Unfortunately, despite
public opposition to Sharia and the gradual Islamization of the country,
Nigeria Christians- clergy and laity- are unprepared for the Muslim challenge.
They have shown the same disunity, weakness, and an uncanny misperception of
Islam not unlike that of their Egyptian and North African co-religionists prior
to the Arab conquest. They do not seem to have learned from history. In fact it
is unlikely that the Islamic project would have made any progress without the
enabling legal expertise and political support of the Southerners. For example,
the Sharia “egg was hatched when Obasanjo was Head of State (1976-1979): Rotimi
Williams headed the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), which had as its
leaders eminent lawyers like Professor Ben Nwabueze, Richard Akinjide and Bola
Ige. Other prominent southern politicians, who were also members of the CDC,
were either compromised or intimidated by the Islamic zealots. Only the
alliance formed between members from the Middle Belt and the South South “put a
check on the planned Islamization of Nigeria after the death of General
Murtala.”
ISLAM IN ALAIGBO
There was a time when
Igboland- and indeed the former Eastern Nigeria
also known as Biafra- was seen as a region uncontaminated by Islam.
Ojukwu expressed this unique position of Igboland as a cordon sanitaire against
the Islamic threat in the Ahiara Declaration. “The Biafran struggle,” he
proclaimed, “is, on a similar plane, a resistance to the Arab expansionism,
which has menaced and ravaged the African continent for twelve centuries.”
Describing Biafra as “a non-Muslim island in a raging Islamic
sea,” 68 he revealed the secret plot of
northern Nigerian Moslems: “Throughout the ill-fated Nigerian experiment,” he
said, “the Muslims hoped to infiltrate Biafra by peaceful means and quiet propaganda, but failed. Then the late
Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduana of Sokoto tried, by political and economic blackmail
and terrorism, to convert Biafrans settled in Northern Nigeria to Islam. His hope was that these Biafrans of
dispersion would then carry Islam to Biafra, and by
so doing give the religion political control of the area.” 69
Unfortunately, Ojukwu’s
prediction, to a certain extent, has been realized. AlaIgbo is no longer
untainted by Islam. Otherwise, how could one explain the exponential growth of
Islam since the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War: the increased number of mosques
and Islamic educational institutions, the growing numbers of well-educated Igbo
Muslim leaders, the obvious affluence and influence of Igbo Muslim converts,
and the blatant intensification of the process of Islamization and Arabization
of Igboland.
In fact, unknown to the
Ikemba and most Igbo, Islam had already made a troubling inroad into a remote
part of the nation. In an important and prescient article entitled “A Moslem
Igbo Village,” Prof. Simon Ottenberg wrote: “When I first carried out field
research in Afikpo village group in Igbo country in 1951-1953, Anohia village
seemed much like any other village there, well within the usual range of social
and cultural variation. When I returned in 1959-60 the major portion of Anohia
had become Islamic, a very unusual event among the Igbo.” 70 He identifies two factors responsible for
this unusual phenomenon as well as their its consequences. According to him,
the first was Anohia’s openness to change, which influenced its willingness to
welcome both Christian missionaries and the British colonial authorities. The second was the conversion to Islam of
native son: “In 1957 a son of Anohia, Okpani Egwani, who had been abroad for many
years, suddenly returned. No one had heard from him for a long time. It is said
that he was thought dead and that burial services had been performed for him.
He returned a Moslem, with a small following of Moslem strangers from the
north, in a number of automobiles. He had changed his name to Alhaji Ibrahim.
71 Born in 1929 in the Ezi Ewa compound of Anohia, Egwani studied at the Afikpo
Primary School, worked in Calabar and on the island of Fernando Po (now Malabor), where learned some
Spanish, and joined the Nigerian army in 1944.
“After his discharge he stayed at Lagos where he claims to have had a dream about God
which made him to travel far, to Egypt, in West Africa, and
to Gabon and the Congo… On his voyages he joined the Moslem sect of
Tijaniyya, following the spiritual leadership of Ibrahim Nyas of Kaolak, near
Darkar…He joined up after having a dream about this man, whom he then visited,
and who converted him. 72
Egwani’s return to Afikpo
was a disaster for his people. While on the one hand, he was successful in
converting “most of those who belonged
to the related group of patrilineages of which he was a member, wives who had
married into these groupings, and a few other Anohia persons” (Descent and kin
ties played a key role in conversion.), on the other hand, he was unable to
recruit most of Afikpo to the new religion. In fact the presence of Islam had
three negative effects on the society. First, it led to the destruction and
subversion of indigenous life and culture. For example, “On Sunday,
October 28, 1958, in the
presence of the assistant officer and a number of police, Northerners who were
followers the Alhaji destroyed the shrines by taking to the secret society bush
and burning them. The Anohia converts had not wished to do so themselves. The
shrine pots and other items were taken from their rock resting places, their
sheds, their ancestral houses, or wherever they were, and every shrine in the
first ward of Anohia was burned. All but a part of the secret society bush was
cut down and cleared; its shrine was also burned. The shrine in front of the
men’s rest house of the main ward was also destroyed, as well as the secret
masks and other paraphernalia stored inside of the house.” 73
Second, it engendered rancor, division and increased tension among the
people. Disputes arose over the use of community property and the maintenance
of traditional norms : the market, rest house, secret society bush, fishing
pond, and the celebration of festivals and the non observance of taboos. “There followed, in 1957 and 1958, a series
of court cases, largely instituted by the non-Moslem elders of Afikpo and
non-converts from Anohia, to prevent the burning of the shrines and other
contemplated changes in the village.”
74 Third, it introduced an Arab/
Islamic culture that is diametrically opposed to basic Igbo concepts of
democracy, liberty, freedom, republicanism, and religious and cultural
tolerance. At the suggestion of Egwani, their leader, the Muslim section of
Anohia “ changed its name to Medina Village.” 75 The traditional men’s
rest house became a mosque. “ Among the Anohia Moslems the wearing of a cap and
a long gown- often white- and the use of prayer beads, all became standard, as
did the daily round of prayers. Persons no longer stood up when urinating,
women no longer wore the traditional belt underneath their cloth or clothing.
Men bowed and then touched their right hand to their chest in greeting. Palm
wine and other strong drink, such as native gin, was forbidden…” 76 At one feast, ending Ramadan, the Afikpo
Muslim women sang:
“Islam girls have won from the rest
in singing
Michael get up. The day has broken,
the cock has crowed.
Dinah Ugo, it will be good for you.
A stick in your hand (something nice in your
hand). She who has money will not
become a prostitute…
I go out to a big town, a very nice
town. She who is annoyed will not come
among us…
You should try to change up your
manner, the Moslem people are coming…”
77
Afikpo people saw Islam as
a threat and fought back to contain it culturally, religiously, politically,
and legally. At Anohia “ a mat fence was eventually erected to separate the two
parts of the village from each other…The heart of the secret society shrine was
later recovered by its priest and reestablished in the traditional section of
the village…” Islamic converts were barred from active participation in
society, especially because of their total disregard for traditional norms.
Ostracism was a potent weapon of the non- Muslims. And the fate of one Chief
Iwu Egwu, a prominent leader from Ngodo
village, testifies to the power of Igbo traditional society as the defender of
Igbo culture and tradition. After his conversion to Islam, “ he was then fined
by the senior Afikpo age grades, and was more or less ostracized by other
leaders, although he was an influential man and was associated with the
progressive and schooled persons in the village- groups. After some time he
withdrew from Islam and paid his five pound fine, but he never regained the
stature in Afikpo he had held prior to his conversion, and was much ridiculed
for his action.” 78 Satirical village okumkpa plays also
portrayed Chief Egwu’s conversion to Islam as being motivated by monetary and
selfish interests. Afikpo children were taught make fun of Muslims by shouting
at them and calling them “Mallam, Mallam.”
79 No doubt the most important response of Afikpo to the Muslim threat
was that of the ekpe uke esa, the major and most senior Afikpo age group: At
the end of 1959, it called a meeting of the elders of five village groups to
coordinate collective security measures against the Islamic menace, and to
raise money to take the issue to court as well as to petition the Eastern
Nigerian government based in Enugu. “ The calling together of the five
village-groups is rare; it is normally carried out only when there is serious
trouble between two of them or internally within a village group- in either
case when the matter remains unresolved. The five groups act as conciliators, but
without final authority. In the present case their aim was clearly to control
and contain Moslem authority. They did not ask the Moslems to come and to
present their side of the matter.” 80
Throughout this struggle, it is instructive that the British colonial
government was pro- Islamic, while the Native Authority supported Afikpo
traditionalists. 81
In terms of propagating
the Islamic faith in Igboland, perhaps one town and two institutions have
played the most significant roles: With 14 mosques, Nsukka is, undoubtedly the
Islamic capital of AlaIgbo 82 And no
other educational institution is as important to Muslims as the one in Afikpo,
Ebonyi State. Originally known as Jama-al-Nazral School and based in Enugu,
it was moved to Ntezi, a remote but beautiful area outside Afikpo, where it has
existed for 9 years. 83 ( No connection has been established between
this institution and the remnants of the Anohia Islamic community). Educa